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Abstract: We explore the effects of culture, regulation, and geographical factors on bilateral cross-border 
bank lending. Using a newly compiled dataset on BIS-reporting banks’ activities, we find that 
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bilateral bank lending. Trust between individuals in the two countries matters only as a proxy for other 
cultural similarities.  The relationship between bank regulatory differences and lending flows has changed 
over time. Before the crisis, banks made more cross-border loans in countries with regulations that 
promoted market discipline and transparency, but took on more risk in countries that had less 
transparency, perhaps in pursuit of higher returns.   This relationship between transparency and banking 
flows has disappeared in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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Cultural and regulatory similarities play an important role in shaping economic exchange between 
countries because they mitigate informational asymmetries (Guiso et al, 2009, Portes and Rey, 2005). In 
the case of financial transactions in particular, cultural and regulatory similarities reduce the costs 
associated with evaluating and monitoring borrowers and investment projects across borders. Geographic 
proximity may also play a role in reducing monitoring costs.  But, in a computerized global financial 
system with sophisticated means of managing risk, are basic determinants of relationships like culture and 
geographic distance still relevant?  Can regulation substitute for trust?  Our research answers both these 
questions affirmatively, at least to some extent.  We find that geographic proximity and indicators of 
common institutional arrangements are associated with more cross-border lending and risk taking.  In 
contrast, we find only mixed evidence that indicators of common cultural heritage predict bilateral 
banking relationships.  Finally, we find that the role of some measures of regulatory similarity in 
explaining cross-border flows of loans and risk changed after the financial crisis.   
These results are important because recent developments in global financial innovation have the 
potential to change the nature of global banks’ lending and risk management practices. Previously, when 
banks in one country made loans to borrowers in another country, both the costs of doing business and the 
costs of monitoring have been concentrated in the borrower’s country. Recently, the increasing use of 
financial derivatives and third-party guarantees have made it so that banks have the ability to transfer a 
substantial amount of the risk associated with international lending to residents of a third country. The 
ability to do so enables banks to separate the profit implications of operating in a country with a similar 
culture or close geographic proximity from risk management concerns, and theoretically, this ability 
allows higher risk countries to become more integrated into the global financial system.  However, in 
spite of the growing amount of cross-border banking, we find that geography, culture, and common 
history or institutional arrangements still anchor these transactions. 
In developing these results, our primary contribution is that we use a unique and detailed dataset 
on bilateral cross-border bank lending volumes, risk transfers, and guarantees to refine our understanding 
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of the roles of culture, geography, and regulation in shaping the patterns of cross-border financial 
transactions.  Our approach enhances the approach of others that have used gravity models to explain 
these bilateral transactions because we add to the standard gravity model variables that proxy for cultural 
and regulatory similarities between the source and the host countries.   A third contribution allowed by 
our unique dataset is that we are able to examine the pre- and post-financial crisis periods separately – an 
important consideration in light of the apparent regime change in bank risk management practices 
(Temesvary, 2014; Berger and Bouwman 2013; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012).  
Our results show that institutional and historical measures, such as common legal origin, 
geographical distance, communication, and colonial heritage explain the patterns of bilateral lending best, 
relative to bilateral trust or bank regulatory arbitrage. Specifically, we find that bilateral trust between 
pairs of countries appears to be a significant determinant of lending activity, but this significance goes 
away once we include other cultural factors that determine trust. We find limited evidence on the role of 
bank regulatory differences (arbitrage opportunities) in driving bilateral bank lending. Before the crisis, 
banks lent more direct loans to host countries whose regulatory framework promoted transparency in 
bank management practices, but also simultaneously took on more risk in less transparent countries, 
perhaps in search of higher returns. After the crisis, however, banks lent less and took on less risk in 
countries that had fewer restrictions on the activities in which banks can engage.  
Our use of a gravity model to examine the cultural, historical and geographical drivers of cross-
border bank lending flows brings together two strands of the literature. One strand of related literature 
examines the role of cultural connections and bilateral trust in driving cross-border economic transactions 
while the second explores gravity models of bilateral bank lending.  
Literature on cultural connections, trust, and economic transactions examines a variety of 
phenomena including trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, cross-border 
mergers, and migration.  (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009; Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi, 
(forthcoming); and Spring and Grossman, 2013).  There are a few papers that, like this one, study the 
impact of trust and culture on cross-border banking, however, as we explain further below, the previous 
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research examines a much more concentrated geographic area and only examines cross-border asset flows 
and not the transfer of risk. 
In a seminal paper on the relationship between culture, trust, and economic exchange, Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2009) explore trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment, and portfolio 
flows between European countries.  They find that bilateral trust is an important driver of cross-border 
transactions, even when they use cultural variables such as genetic distance, use of common language, or 
similar legal origins as instruments for trust between individuals of two countries. In a related finding, 
Guiso et al (2004) find that social capital plays an important role in the use of and access to financial 
services and investment. The effect of social capital, hence trust, is particularly important in areas where 
legal enforcement is weak. 
As mentioned above, a few authors have carried this line of investigation into the literature on the 
determinants of cross-border banking transactions.  The most closely related paper to ours is Buch, 
Driscoll and Ostergaard (2010) who examine the diversification of international asset portfolios for banks 
in five countries and find that higher bilateral trust is related to a country’s assets being over-weighted in 
banks’ portfolios as compared to a benchmark portfolio (with the benchmarks being determined by the 
CAPM).  In another related paper, Heuchemer, Kleimeir, and Sander (2009) study cross-border lending 
within Europe and find a role for geography and cultural factors. More recently, Hahn (2013) studies 
cross-border lending from Austria to neighboring Eastern European Union members.  He also finds a role 
for common cultural heritage in explaining cross-border lending dynamics. Although all of these authors 
are interested in similar issues to the ones we address here, we argue that our work advances knowledge 
of the determinants of cross-border banking because 1) we use a much larger set of countries in our data 
set rather than examining a small number of developed countries, and 2) we examine both cross-border 
lending and cross border transfer of risk.
2
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 Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) examine a related phenomenon—the cross border syndication of bank loans.  They 
find that cultural and geographic distance corresponds to higher lending rates, smaller loan amounts and 
requirements for third-party guarantees.  
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Many of these papers use a gravity model to motivate a basic empirical specification.  Looking at 
small business lending practices, Breevort and Wolken (2009) find that the role of distance in lending 
varies substantially by bank type and over time. Even though the importance of physical distance has 
decreased in the past years, it remains an important factor in banking.  Breevort and Wolken (2009) 
survey some of the reasons why geographical and informational distance continues to affect lending 
relationships. First, geographical distance limits banks’ ability to evaluate and monitor their clients, and 
also makes it costlier for clients to visit their bank. Second, informational distance increases the cost that 
banks incur in communicating with clients (potentially through third-party intermediaries), as well as the 
cost of evaluating lending prospects. These informational asymmetries are particularly severe for 
commercial loans. For clients, informational distance raises the costs of searching for a potential lender. 
Overall, regulatory changes (such as removal of capital controls) and technological improvements (such 
as online banking) have reduced the role of geographic distance in banking. 
 
In addition to measures of cultural similarities and distance, Portes and Rey (2005) find that costs 
from informational asymmetry between borrower and lender (such as transaction costs) and measures of 
informational flows (such as bilateral telephone traffic) explain bilateral financial transactions well. Using 
a US-centered dataset, Portes et al (2001) find that these informational variables are particularly important 
in determining the flow of assets with higher informational content, such as portfolio equities and 
corporate bonds.  In a related finding, Rose (2000) also finds that measures of institutional similarities 
(such as currency unions) greatly facilitate trade. 
 
Our results are developed in the following three sections. In the next section, we describe the 
data; in Section 3 we present our main results, explore the potential role of heterogeneity in our results, 





2  Methods and Data  
Methods 
In order to investigate the determinants of cross-border lending, we estimate the following model 
Lendingi,j,t = β0 +β1Culturei,j,t + β2Geographyi,j,t + β3Institutionsi,j,t +                                         (1) 
β4Regulationi,j,t  β5Informationi,j,t + μi +γj +λt        
where Lendingi,j,t is lending originating in the source country, i, to the destination country, j, at time, t.  As 
we explain in more detail below, we examine two types of lending:  immediate borrower lending and 
ultimate risk lending.  The former is actual loans made from the source to the destination country while 
the latter is the amount of risk that the source country takes in the destination country after adjusting the 
loan volumes for risk transfer through derivative contracts and loan guarantees. 
Culturei,j,t is a vector of variables that measures cultural similarities between the source and 
destination countries, Geographyi,j,t is a vector of variables that captures geographic relationships between 
the two countries, Institutionsi,j,t includes variables that capture institutional similarities, and Regulationi,j,t 
includes differences in regulatory policies in the two countries.  Because lending and risk taking may be 
more prevalent in countries in which the residents communicate with each other, we also include a proxy 
for information flows between the two countries.  Source country dummies, destination country dummies, 
and a time dummy are represented by μi, γj, and λt, respectively.  
We estimate Equation 1 using panel data.  Data availability for regulatory differences and 
ultimate risk lending restricts our examination to two periods (2005-2006 and 2011-2012).  Fortunately, 
however, these two time periods allow us to examine both pre and post-crisis lending.  Although a Chow 
test does not reject the pooling assumption that all coefficients are jointly equal across time periods, in 
supplementary estimations we also estimate a SUR model in which we report separate coefficients for the 
two time periods in order to examine individual coefficients, especially the impact of bank regulation.  
Finally, because our data does not record any lending volumes less than zero, we also confirm that our 





Our two main dependent variables of interest consist of data on cross-border direct lending, and lending 
adjusted for cross-border risk transfers (as done through derivatives and guarantees). The majority 
(approximately 52 percent) of the cross-border loans are made to the non-financial private sector in the 
borrowing country.  Roughly one-third of the bilateral loans are made to banks, while the remaining loans 
are made to the public sector.  A little more than half (about 55 percent) of the loans are short term, with 
maturities of less than one year, while the bulk of the remaining loans (39 percent of the total) have 
maturities over two years.  
All data on bilateral cross-border bank claims come from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)’s Consolidated Banking Statistics. Each BIS-reporting country reports consolidated foreign banking 
data by target country, on a bilateral basis.
3
 All data are reported on a “consolidated” basis.4 Data on an 
“immediate borrower” basis is taken from Item 9B of the statistical release. This dataset captures the 
volume of foreign claims originating from any BIS-reporting country to any destination country. The BIS 
also reports data on an “ultimate risk” basis, which is Item 9D of the statistical release. Ultimate risk 
lending volumes are the actual (immediate borrower) loans made after adjustment for risk transfers. 
Therefore, ultimate risk lending data captures the amount of claims a BIS-reporting country has in a 
destination country, but only the amount for the repayment of which the given destination country is 
responsible.
5
 It follows that for any BIS-reporting source country, its “immediate borrower” claims in the 
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 The list of BIS-reporting countries is as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (FYR), Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, plus the European Central Bank. 
4
 This means that the lending is irrespective of where the loan is actually booked. With consolidated data, the 
location of the loan does not matter – only the nationality of the lender and borrower. For instance, if Bank of 
America makes a loan to Subaru in Germany of $60, then a loan directly to Japan of $40, the total value of 
American loans to Japan would be reported at $100, without mention of Germany. 
5
 For instance, suppose that Bank of America makes a loan to Subaru in Japan of $100 – this is reported as the 
immediate borrower amount between the US-Japan pair. But now suppose that $30 of this loan is securitized by a 
British company. Then Britain is ultimately responsible for the repayment of this $30, while Japan remains 
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destination country (Item 9B) plus the net risk transfer into the destination country makes up the source 
country’s “ultimate risk” amount of claims in the destination country (Item 9D). 
There is a strong “common lender” effect in cross-border bilateral lending data – there are few 
lending (source) countries relative to the number of destination (host) countries. To account for this fact, 
in addition to the source and destination country dummies mentioned above, we use as dependent 
variables the share of the given source country’s loans in that time period that go to each individual host 
country.  Furthermore, in order to smooth through quarterly fluctuations in lending we consider a “time 
period” to be two years.  Thus, the lending data for each time period is the average of eight quarterly 
observations for each country pair in each time period.   
 As mentioned above, our independent variables include sets of variables that capture common 
cultural, institutional, regulatory, information flows, and geographic characteristics between the source 
and destination countries.  More specifically, to proxy for common cultural characteristics, we include a 
dummy variable if the two countries share a common spoken language.  We also incorporate measures 
that may be more indirect measures of shared culture.  These include a variable measuring genetic 
distance between indigenous populations
6
 and a dummy variable indicating if the source country is a 
former colony of the destination country.  These indirect measures may more be determinants of shared 
culture, and, in fact, Guiso et al. (2009) use these indirect measures of culture as instruments for bilateral 
trust.  We do not follow that same estimation strategy for our entire set of countries because bilateral trust 
data is not available. However, for a subset of our sample that contains European countries, we are able to 
use a measure of bilateral trust from Guiso et al. (2009) and in some estimations use these indirect 
measures of culture as instruments for trust in the European sample.   
In addition to shared culture measures, we include several other variables as well.  To proxy for 
common institutional characteristics we include dummy variables indicating if two countries share a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
ultimately responsible for $70. Then the ultimate risk database would report a $30 loan from the US to Britain, and 
$70 from the US to Japan. 
6
 This measure was developed by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1996), and is based on the existence of 
genetic or DNA polymorphism (a situation in which a gene or a DNA sequence exist in at least two different forms. 
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common legal origin and if they use a common currency.  Geographic relationships between two 
countries are captured in a variable measuring the distance between two countries (weighted by 
population location) and a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are contiguous.
7
 As a proxy 
for information flows, we also include phone traffic between the two countries as measured by the percent 
of all incoming calls to the source country made by the destination country.
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We also include a set of explanatory variables that capture similarities in bank regulatory 
frameworks between pairs of countries. Data on bank regulations come from the World Bank’s Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database. The 2007 and 2012 surveys are used. For each country in the 
sample, indices of regulatory stringency are constructed based on various dimensions of regulation. These 
summary indices are taken from an updated version of the dataset constructed in Barth et al (2005). In 
order to capture regulatory differences between countries, for each measure the host country’s regulatory 
indicator is subtracted from the source country’s values. Therefore positive values of these regulatory 
difference measures indicate that the source country is stricter than the destination country. Negative 
values, on the other hand, indicate a relatively stricter destination country regulator. We examine bank 
regulatory differences along three dimensions: “supervisory power” is an index of official supervisory 
power, i.e. whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and 
correct problems. Our “activity restrictions” index measures overall restrictions on banking activities – 
more specifically the extent to which banks may engage in the underwriting and dealing of securities and 
insurance products, and investment in real estate. Finally, our “private monitoring” variable measures 
whether there are incentives or ability for the private monitoring of banks. This is a measure of the extent 
to which the public is made aware of regulatory actions taken against banks, and the extent to which 
banks are required to disclose their risk management and off balance sheet practices. 
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 We weight the distance by population so that relatively more “important” cities are weighted more heavily in 
determining how far apart the countries are. 
8
 An alternative specification would be to measure the source country’s outgoing phone traffic to a given destination 
country as the share of all calls going out of the source country. However, due to reporting limitations in the 
Telegeography publication, doing so would result in a substantial loss of available data. 
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All of our data is summarized in Tables 1 through 3.  Table 1 provides a detailed description of 
the variables and data sources, Table 2 gives summary statistics and Table 3 shows averages by time 
period.  These statistics indicate that, on average, bilateral lending is fairly well diversified across 
destination countries with the average share of immediate borrowing lending being only 2 percent and 
ultimate risk lending 1.8 percent of the share of loans from the source country.  While it is true that the 
maximum percentage for each type of lending to one country is much higher (78 percent of total loans for 
one source country for immediate borrowing lending and 67 percent for ultimate risk lending), this is not 
typical.  In fact, the 95
th
 percentile for immediate borrower lending is 10 percent and for ultimate risk 
lending it is only 9.8 percent.  In other words, for a country pair that is in the 95
th
 percentile, that 
immediate borrower lending represents only 10 percent of the cross border immediate borrower lending 
for that source country.  The trends in Table 3 show that while the dollar volume of loans increased over 




3.1 Main Specification 
We present results of the estimation of Equation 1 in Table 4.  Columns 1 through 5 present results for 
immediate borrower lending and columns 6 through 10 provide results for ultimate risk lending.  In the 
first column for each type of lending, we include our most basic specification which includes measures of 
culture (common spoken language), institutional arrangements (common legal system and common 
currency), and information flows (phone calls).  In the second column (columns 2 and 6), we add 
variables that are more indirect measures of common culture (genetic distance, years at war, and colonial 
ties).   
 We find several interesting results that are generally similar for both types of lending.  Our first 
result of note is that geography matters.  Both contiguous and distance enter in the ultimate risk (UR) and 
immediate borrower (IB) regressions in expected ways.  More specifically, source countries lend a 
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significantly greater share of both types of loans to contiguous host countries. Furthermore, the farther the 
host country is from the source country, the smaller is the share of both types of lending that it can 
receive. These variables remain significant, even after controlling for cultural and institutional factors.  
The magnitudes of these effects are reasonable, but also notable.  For example, the results in Column 1 of 
Table 4 suggest that a lender will increase the share of immediate borrower loans to a contiguous 
borrower by .69 percentage points.  Given that the average share for any one country pair is two percent, 
this is a meaningful increase. While these results are in line with the “gravity” literature on trade flows, 
we contribute by showing that such gravity effects prevail in the case of banking flows across a large 
range of countries as well. In this context, these results are consistent with the theory that geographic 
proximity reduces monitoring costs. 
Second, we find evidence that common institutional arrangements matter in expected ways.  
Specifically, source countries allocate a significantly greater share of their UR and IB lending to countries 
that share the same legal system (French vs. Anglo-Saxon, etc.). The magnitude of the coefficient in 
Column 1 indicates that the economic significance of this effect is similar to the country pairs sharing a 
border. To the extent that contracts are easier to write and enforce, and litigation is easier to manage in 
familiar legal environments, this result is easier to interpret in the case of financial flows than in the trade 
literature. Interestingly, we do not find any evidence that sharing a common currency affects loan shares.  
This suggests that the financial markets have provided sufficient tools to mitigate currency risk and any 
transaction costs associated with foreign exchange.  One reason that we find this result for bilateral bank 
loans but Rose (2000) does not find it for trade in goods and services is that the lending banks may 
already be active participants in currency markets and have fairly low transaction costs in hedging 
currency risk. An alternative explanation is that sharing a common currency does not matter if the 
majority of cross-border loans are denominated in one of the global reserve currencies (US dollars or 
Euros).
9
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 Unfortunately, our data does not include information about the currency denomination of the loans.  The BIS 
converts all loans to $US for reporting purposes. 
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In contrast to the result that foreign exchange does not matter, information exchange clearly does.  
Information exchange and communication as measured by phone traffic is strongly positively correlated 
with bank lending flows.  Using phone traffic data from the 1990s, previous papers have shown that this 
relationship exists for bilateral trade and FDI & FPI flows (Portes and Rey, 2005). Our analysis uses an 
updated phone traffic database to show that bilateral phone traffic prevails as a driver of bank lending as 
well. And, the effect is quite large:  The results in Column 1 of Table 4 indicate that a one standard 
deviation increase in Phone Calls (4.5 percent) is associated with a 3.1 percentage point increase in the 
share of immediate borrower loans. 
We find mixed results for shared culture.  Our only direct measure of shared culture (common 
spoken language) is insignificant in all the estimations.  However, when we add indirect measures of 
shared culture we obtain some significant results.  The one (indirect) measure of shared culture that enters 
significantly and in the expected way is the shared colonial history.  If the source country is a former 
colony of the destination country, then both types of lending are significantly higher.  Results in Column 
2 and 6 of Table 4 indicate that this type of colonial relationship increases the share of immediate 
borrower lending by 4.2 percentage points and the share of ultimate risk lending by 7.9 percentage points.  
Again, given that the average shares for these two types of lending are around 2 percent, these effects are 
quite large.  It is notable that this variable retains significance even after controlling for common legal 
origin, suggesting that the effect is a result of more than just institutional similarities.  The second indirect 
measure of shared culture is genetic distance.  This variable enters the regressions inconsistently, 
prohibiting us from drawing any conclusions about the relationship between genetic distance and cross-
border lending. 
Finally, none of the measures of differences in regulatory practices enter our regressions significantly.  
However, as we explain below, we explore this relationship in greater detail by examining pre and post-
crisis results to allow for the possibility that the effect of regulations on bank lending has changed over 




3.2 Alternative specifications and robustness checks 
In this section, we explore some alternative specifications to qualify and add to our main results. We start 
by exploring the additional role that bilateral trust plays beyond cultural and historical ties, using a 
subsample of our data for which such a measure is available. We move on to examine the issue of time 
dependence in the role of bank regulatory similarities in driving bank lending flows. In addition to 
conducting some robustness checks, we also explore the extent to which our results may depend on the 
target sector of bank lending. 
Incorporating bilateral trust 
As mentioned previously, several authors have explored the role of bilateral trust in influencing economic 
exchange.  However, in our full sample bilateral trust data is not available and we must confine ourselves 
to including as independent variables country characteristics that have been used as determinants of 
bilateral trust.  However, direct measures of bilateral trust from survey data are available for a subsample 
of European countries from Guiso et al (2009).
10
  We replace the variables that were indirect measures of 
trust between two countries (genetic distance and colonial relationship) with the bilateral trust data in 
estimations that are reported in Table 5.  In columns 1 through 5 of Table 5, we present results from OLS 
estimation of immediate borrower lending.  In column 6, we instrument for trust with variables from 
Guiso et al. (2009) that they show are determinants of trust (genetic distance, number of years at war 
between 1000 and 1970, and differences in GDP).  Similarly, in columns 7 through 11, results for 
ultimate risk lending appear and, in column 12, we again instrument for trust in the estimation of ultimate 
risk lending. 
 The results in Table 5 indicate that when no other control variables are used (columns 1 and 7), 
bilateral trust has a significant positive effect both on immediate borrower and ultimate risk lending.  
However, as control variables for geography, common institutional arrangements, information exchange, 
and regulatory similarities are added, bilateral trust loses significance in explaining both types of lending.  
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 The underlying data is from the Eurobarometer survey sponsored by the European Commission.  The data is from 
a question that asked individuals to rate how much they trusted citizens from a number of other European countries, 
on a four-point scale.   
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These conclusions also hold when we instrument for trust (columns 6 and 12).  Thus, the lack of evidence 
for a strong link between shared culture and bank lending in the broader sample is duplicated in the 
European sample. 
 In addition, most of our larger sample conclusions are supported with the results of the European 
sample.  Specifically, we find a strong positive effect for shared institutional arrangements via the effect 
of a common legal system and a strong positive effect for information exchange as proxied by the effect 
of phone calls.  The effect of distance is also confirmed, with countries that are farther from each other 
experiencing less bilateral lending.  An interesting difference, however, is that in the European 
subsample, sharing a common border with a destination country is not significantly correlated with 
increased lending flows there.  Because of the extent of the integration of European Union economies, 
sharing a border in this region may not have as much economic significance as in a broader sample of 
countries. 
Separating time periods 
Although our main results are from a specification in which we pool observations across time periods and 
control for differential effects of the two time periods with a time fixed-effect, we also check to see if our 
results are robust to estimating separate coefficients for each time period using SUR analysis.  Because 
one of our time periods is pre-crisis and one is post-crisis, this method has the advantage of removing the 
restriction that the coefficients on all of the explanatory variables are constant both before and after the 
financial crisis. 
11
  A disadvantage, however, is that the sample used to estimate each coefficient is 
significantly reduced because we can only use observations in which we have data for both time periods.  
We present the SUR results for immediate borrower lending in Table 6A and for ultimate risk lending in 
Table 6B. 
 The results in Table 6A and 6B confirm several of our earlier results:  the importance of 
information exchange, geography, and colonial relationships are all borne out in SUR estimations.  
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 As we reported earlier, a Chow test does not allow us to reject this restriction when jointly imposed on all the 
coefficients.  In the SUR analysis, however, we test the restriction on specific coefficients individually.   
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Interestingly, however, the evidence for the effect of common legal systems is weaker, but the evidence 
for the effect of different regulatory practices is stronger.  While loss of significance of the common legal 
system variable may in part be due to a smaller sample size, the pre and post-crisis impact of differing 
regulatory practices are consistent with bank behavior being affected by the crisis. 
Examination of the effects of bank regulatory considerations by time period reveals some 
interesting patterns. First, the negative coefficient on private monitoring in Column 3 in Table 6A and the 
positive coefficient in Column 3 in Table 6B indicate that relatively stricter private monitoring in the 
destination country leads to significantly more immediate borrower lending, but significantly less ultimate 
risk lending, to the destination country in the pre-crisis period.
12
 The interpretation is that banks lend 
more direct loans to host countries that have strict and well-enforced transparency laws in place, such as 
requirements for banks to reveal risk management practices and off-balance sheet activities. At the same 
time, banks were also willing to take on more risk in countries that had relatively weaker transparency 
laws during the pre-crisis period.  There is no evidence of these effects in the post-crisis period.  Why 
would less transparent banking practices be associated with banks being willing to take on more risk?  
One possibility is that rates of return were higher in countries with less transparent practices, enticing 
banks to take on more risk.  Although our data does not contain information on rates of return to loans to 
specific countries, we can use stock market returns as a proxy for rate of return to bank loans to 
investigate this channel (Buch et al, 2010).  We find that, in fact, lower levels of private monitoring are 
associated with higher stock market returns.
13
  Post-crisis, we find a similar correlation between 
transparency regulation and stock market returns, however, we find no evidence of the effect of 
transparency regulation on banks’ willingness to take on risk in a specific country during the later time 
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 Recall that the regulation variables are the differences in a regulatory index calculated by taking the source 
country value minus the destination country value.  Thus, a positive difference indicates that the source country has 
stricter regulation. 
13
 Specifically, in the pre-crisis period, an increase in the private monitoring index of one is associated with a 




period. Perhaps the financial crisis sensitized banks to taking on risk when there is less transparency and 
the risk could not be as well understood. 
Differences in regulatory restrictions on banking activities also appear to have a differential effect 
on cross-border bank lending pre and post-crisis.  In the earlier time period, we find no effect of 
differences in regulatory restrictions on banking activities for either immediate borrower or ultimate risk 
lending (Column 5 of Tables 6A and 6B).  However, post-crisis, there is a fairly strong negative effect, 
with banks being less likely to lend on either an immediate borrower or an ultimate risk basis to countries 
which allow banks to engage in a greater variety of activities.  This result is consistent with banks being 
more sensitized to risk as a result of the financial crisis and being less willing to lend in countries in 
which the banking sector might be associated with greater risk. 
Tobit estimation 
In addition to the SUR estimation, we also explore if our results are robust to an additional specification 
that might be suggested by the nature of the data.  One important issue to explore is that there is a small 
number of observations in our larger dataset that have zero entries for bilateral bank flows. This fact 
raises concerns about the effect of left-censoring of the data. To determine if this affects our conclusions, 
we estimate a Tobit model with our pooled dataset used to generate our main results. The Tobit 
specification yields results that are very close to the pooled specification presented in Table 4 and we do 
not present them in detail here.  
Target sector-specific estimation 
The considerations that go into banks’ choices of how much to lend to a given country may also 
depend on the target sector of lending. For instance, there may be substantial differences in the intensity 
of monitoring that is necessary for a loan going to another large bank across borders, versus a private 
individual abroad. Furthermore, loans to governments might be motivated by political considerations as 
well. In light of these differences, it is important to explore the extent to which our results might vary by 
the target sector of lending in a host country. While such sector-specific breakdown is not available in our 
main data, we are able to investigate this issue using a different dataset on U.S. banks’ foreign lending.  
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This supplemental dataset, compiled from regulatory sources, provides information on U.S. 
banks’ immediate borrower and ultimate risk bilateral lending to three sectors in each host country: the 
banking sector, the non-financial private sector and the public sector. While this dataset is valuable in that 
it provides sector-specific lending data, it is important to keep in mind that such data is only available for 
one source country: the United States. Because of this, there are many limitations on our ability to 
investigate all of the independent variables that we use in our main specifications.  Specifically, none of 
the destination countries for U.S. bank loans share a common currency, only two destination countries are 
contiguous, and there are only three destination countries from which the U.S. was colonized.  Therefore, 
we exclude these variables from our estimation due to their limited variation.  In addition, because we 
only have one source country and, at most, two observations for each destination country, we are unable 
to estimate coefficients for dummy variables for the destination and source country.  Instead, we estimate 
a country specific random effect for destination countries of U.S. cross-border bank loans. 
We obtain similar results for both immediate borrower lending and ultimate risk lending so only 
report in detail the results of the ultimate risk lending in Tables 7A (banking sector), 7B (public sector), 
and 7C (non-financial private sector).
14
  There are a few broad conclusions that can be drawn from these 
results.  First, information exchange, as measured by cross-border phone calls remains positively and 
significantly associated with all types of lending.  Second, there are some differences in the variables that 
are associated with lending to different sectors.  Lending to the banking sector seems to be positively 
influenced by sharing a common language.  Sharing a common language is not a statistically significant 
determinant of lending to the public sector and is significant in only one of the specifications explaining 
lending to the private sector.  In addition, sharing a common legal origin is negatively related to loans to 
the public sector.  This result is in contrast to the results we obtained with our broader data set and may be 
an artifact of examining only data from U.S. banks. Many of the other countries in the data set that share a 
common legal origin with the U.S. are also former British colonies, many of them with less stable 
governments. 
                                                             
14
 Detailed results for immediate borrower lending are available from the authors upon request. 
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In sum, although the results in Table 7 suggest that cross-border lending to different sectors may 
be influenced by different factors, data limitations prohibit strong conclusions.  Because this data is 
available for only one source country, the sample size is significantly reduced and idiosyncratic features 
of the source country may influence the results.  
4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore the effects of culture, institutional arrangements, information exchange, 
regulations and geographical factors on bilateral cross-border bank lending. Using a newly compiled 
dataset on BIS-reporting banks’ activities, we find that geography, institutional arrangements and 
communication are the primary drivers of bilateral lending flows. We find very little evidence that 
cultural similarities play a role.   
Our results are consistent with the idea that the role of bank regulatory differences has changed 
over time. Before the crisis, banks lent more to countries with regulations promoting and enabling market 
discipline, but took on more ultimate risk exposure in countries with less transparent banking laws. There 
is evidence to suggest that banks were willing to do so in search of higher returns on their claims. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, this pattern disappears. Instead, in the post-crisis period we find that banks lend 
less in countries with fewer restrictions on banking activities. This suggests that banks are not engaging in 
regulatory arbitrage to avoid the consequences of tighter restrictions on banking activity. There is 
evidence that the drivers of cross-border bank lending depend on the target sector as well: loans to other 
banks and the private sector are chosen similarly, while public sector lending is different. 
An important consideration, which we are not able to tackle due to data limitations, is the 
difference between cross-border vs. foreign affiliate-based lending. Much of the trust-based sorting may 
already happen along the lines of local (subsidiary)-based vs. cross-border based lending. Local lending 
allows closer monitoring of the borrowers and loans. However, setting up an office is a major 
commitment that might be risky if the political and economic climate is very different. Therefore, an 
interesting extension would be to examine the extent to which these same factors influence whether 
lending occurs via cross-border loans vs. local affiliates.   
18 
 




























Variable Definition Source 
   
IB percent Percent of source country's IB lending 
to destination country 
Bank for International for 
Settlements (BIS) 
UR percent Percent of source country's ultimate 
risk lending to destination country 
BIS 
Common language =1 if common spoken language Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Contiguous =1 if share a border Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Distance Distance weighted by population Mayer and Ries (2010) 
   
Common legal =1 if have common legal origins Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Common currency =1 if have common currency Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Phone calls incoming phone calls from destination 
to source country as a percent of total 




Genetic distance Fst genetic distance Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) 
Destination Colony =1 if source country a former colony of 
destination country 
Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Supervisory Power Supervisory Power index of source 
country minus supervisory power index 
of destination country 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005), 
updated 
Private Monitoring Private monitoring index of source 
country minus private monitoring 
index of destination 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005), 
updated 
Banking Restriction restrictions on banking activities of 
source country minus restrictions in 
destination country 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005), 
updated 
Bilateral trust Trust from source to destination 
country residents 




Table 2: Summary Statistics of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IB percent 1375 2.0213 5.6048 0 0.776931 
UR percent 1249 1.8679 5.1178 0 0.673221 
Common language 1375 0.348864 0.327721 0 1 
Contiguous 1375 0.088727 0.284453 0 1 
Distance 1375 5006.319 4202.942 160.9283 19781.39 
      
Common legal 1375 0.353455 0.478216 0 1 
Common currency 1375 0.110546 0.313683 0 1 
Phone calls 1375 01.7352 4.5399 2.37E-06 0.45298 
Genetic distance 1343 525.4535 622.9934 0 2292 
Destination Colony 1375 0.010182 0.100427 0 1 
Supervisory Power 1113 0.091644 0.82489 -2 2 
Private Monitoring 988 -0.91903 2.800261 -9 7 
Banking Restriction 944 -0.56144 2.201522 -9 7 






Table 3: Averages by time period 
Variable  Mean  
  2006-2007 2011-2012 
    
IB lending as a percent of total 1.9608 2.083 
UR lending as a percent of total 1.8075 1.9298 
IB lending in dollars  22262.67 27007.97 
UR lending in dollars  24093.4 29194.09 
Supervisory Power (source - destination) -0.00515 0.198113 
Private monitoring (source - destination) -1.38202 -0.37445 











Table 4:  Full Sample Results 
             (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Immediate Borrower Lending Ultimate Risk Lending 
Common Langauge -0.6908 -0.4949 -0.4753 -0.196 -0.1437 -0.3871 -0.372 -0.3267 0.0168 0.1329 
 
(0.51) (0.51) (0.56) (0.61) (0.66) (0.57) (0.57) (0.61) (0.67) (0.70) 
Contiguous 0.6879* 0.7600* 1.0425** 1.0492** 1.0865** 0.9798** 0.8153* 1.0917** 1.2165** 1.2132** 
 























(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.6498** 0.6918*** 0.6688** 0.7164** 0.7826** 0.5867** 0.5696** 0.4746 0.5358 0.5909* 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.33) (0.34) 
Common Currency 0.0911 0.382 -0.2671 -0.3218 -0.4109 -0.2348 0.1212 -0.5675 -0.4361 -0.4889 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.52) (0.58) (0.59) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.55) (0.56) 
Phone Calls 0.6960*** 0.6943*** 0.6286*** 0.6364*** 0.6382*** 0.6797*** 0.7154*** 0.6390*** 0.6311*** 0.6269*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Genetic Distance 
 
0.0007** 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0006   0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Destination Colony 
 
4.1762*** 4.6960*** 3.5482*** 3.5334***   7.9172*** 7.0944*** 5.6081*** 5.5750*** 
  















  Banking 
Restrictions 
    
-0.0559   
   
-0.082 
     
(0.10)   
   
(0.11) 
Private Monitoring 






         (0.09)         (0.09)   
Observations 1375 1343 1091 962 918 1281 1250 1010 887 848 
R-squared 0.69 0.7 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.7 0.71 0.71 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include dummy variables for time, source country  




    Table 5: European subsample 
             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Immediate Borrower Lending Ultimate Risk Lending 
Bilateral Trust 9.302*** 3.895* 3.477 3.883* 3.457 -17.585 8.492** 3.248 2.893 3.226 2.852 -19.348 
 




-1.099 -1.682 -1.08 -1.699 -0.69   -1.117 -1.643 -1.081 -1.673 -0.687 
  
























(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contiguous 
 
0.615 1.5 0.615 1.517 0.365   0.692 1.618 0.693 1.62 0.429 
  
(0.94) (1.10) (0.94) (1.10) (1.35)   (0.90) (1.05) (0.90) (1.05) (1.36) 
Phone Calls 
 
0.168** 0.163** 0.167** 0.163** 0.277*   0.191*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.185*** 0.305* 
  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)   (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16) 
Common Legal 
 
1.674*** 1.713** 1.661*** 1.704** 2.048**   1.797*** 1.777*** 1.773*** 1.785*** 2.191** 
  









   
   
(0.19) 




   
Banking Restrictions 




   
-0.096 
 















        (0.33)           (0.31)     
Observations 153 127 118 127 118 127 153 127 118 127 118 127 
R-squared 0.49 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.67 0.48 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.66 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include dummy variables for time, source country and 
destination country.  Columns 6 and 12 estimated via IV estimation.  Instruments for trust are from Guiso et al (2009):  genetic distance, fraction of years at war 
and difference in GDP.
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Table 6A: SUR specification – Immediate borrower basis 
 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 
Common Language -0.788 -0.425 0.108 0.228 0.472 0.571 
 
(0.79) (0.89) (0.96) (1.11) (1.04) (1.20) 
Contiguous 0.793 1.347** 0.974 1.535* 0.942 1.503 
 
(0.57) (0.64) (0.79) (0.92) (0.82) (0.95) 
Distance -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.38 0.875* 0.39 1.141* 0.54 1.431** 
 
(0.42) (0.47) (0.51) (0.59) (0.55) (0.64) 
Common Currency -0.136 -0.157 -0.249 -0.493 -0.395 -0.709 
 
(0.73) (0.82) (0.90) (1.04) (0.94) (1.08) 
Phone Calls 0.640*** 0.595*** 0.612*** 0.617*** 0.611*** 0.617*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Genetic Distance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Destination Colony 6.019*** 6.466*** 2.908* 4.867** 2.83 4.829** 
 
(1.42) (1.60) (1.69) (1.96) (1.74) (2.02) 
Supervisory Power -0.898 -0.382 
    
 
(1.38) (1.51) 









    
-0.15 -3.087*** 
          (0.47) (0.50) 
p-value for null 
hypothesis that the 
coefficients on regulation 
variables are equal across 
time periods 0.69 0.16 0.000 
Observations 488 488 372 372 347 347 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include 
dummy variables for time, source country and destination country
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Table 6B: SUR specification – Ultimate Risk basis 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 
Common Language -0.102 -0.014 1.062 1.006 1.332 1.32 
 
(0.87) (0.94) (1.04) (1.16) (1.08) (1.22) 
Contiguous 0.749 1.491** 1.045 1.702* 0.923 1.589 
 
(0.61) (0.66) (0.89) (0.99) (0.91) (1.03) 
Distance -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.201 0.499 0.147 0.61 0.32 0.775 
 
(0.42) (0.45) (0.52) (0.58) (0.55) (0.63) 
Common Currency -0.645 -0.422 -0.22 -0.217 -0.362 -0.344 
 
(0.69) (0.74) (0.84) (0.94) (0.88) (0.99) 
Phone Calls 0.646*** 0.569*** 0.599*** 0.589*** 0.585*** 0.574*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Genetic Distance 0 0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 0 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Destination Colony 6.981*** 8.480*** 2.814 6.018*** 2.737 6.000*** 
 
(1.50) (1.61) (1.81) (2.03) (1.87) (2.11) 
Supervisory Power 0.004 -1.323 
    
 
(0.51) (1.67) 









    
-0.096 -2.170*** 
          (0.26) (0.54) 
p-value for null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on 
regulation variables are 
equal across time periods 0.44 0.000 0.001 
Observations 461 461 348 348 326 326 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include 




Table 7A:  US Bank Lending to Banking Sector (as a percent of all lending to banking sector) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  UR lending to banking sector 
Common Language 3.1731** 3.0036* 3.0281* 2.9843* 2.9510* 
 
(1.52) (1.62) (1.58) (1.77) (1.77) 
Distance 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal -1.6019 -1.3695 -1.0054 -1.2563 -1.1117 
 
(1.13) (1.24) (1.21) (1.34) (1.35) 
Phone Calls 0.5638*** 0.5414*** 0.5062** 0.5172** 0.5240** 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
Genetic Distance 
 
-0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 
  









    
0.1196 
     
(0.10) 
Private Monitoring 
   
0.0497 
 
    
(0.07) 
 
Observations 128 126 117 113 108 
Number of destination 64 63 62 62 61 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 7B: :  US Bank Lending to Public Sector (as a percent of all lending to public sector) 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  UR lending to public sector 
Common Language 0.6346 0.866 0.8428 0.0685 0.3062 
 
(1.09) (1.15) (1.09) (1.02) (1.04) 
Distance 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal -1.5067* -1.7593** -1.7266** -1.4131* -1.3719* 
 
(0.81) (0.89) (0.83) (0.77) (0.79) 
Phone Calls 0.6039*** 0.6264*** 0.6029*** 0.5815*** 0.6045*** 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Genetic Distance   0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 









Banking Restrictions   




   
(0.09) 








Observations 128 126 117 113 108 
Number of destination 64 63 62 62 61 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Table 7C: :  US Bank Lending to Private Sector (as a percent of all lending to private sector) 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
  UR lending to private sector 
Common Language 2.5044* 2.1027 2.1265 1.939 1.7912 
 
(1.28) (1.33) (1.34) (1.36) (1.36) 
Distance 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.4405 0.0159 0.0796 0.0919 0.246 
 
(0.96) (1.02) (1.03) (1.02) (1.03) 
Phone Calls 0.6751*** 0.7451*** 0.7273*** 0.7323*** 0.7472*** 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Genetic Distance   -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 









Banking Restrictions   




   
(0.11) 









Observations 128 126 117 113 108 
Number of destination 64 63 62 62 61 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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